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The editors' introduction to this thought-provoking collection of arti-
cles is entitled "On the Relevance of Law to Nuclear Weapons." This
query into relevance is the threshold question in any attempt to deal,
prospectively at least, with the legality of a nation's use of force to re-
solve international disputes. The Vietnam experience shows that the
courts are unwilling to treat such issues as justiciable.' Instead, they are
left for political evaluation and action by Congress and the electorate.
But this, as the editors point out, does not make legal evaluation irrele-
vant. Law may serve a worthwhile purpose in bringing to the attention
of political leaders, and those whom they are elected to serve, the ethical
and moral considerations that underlie their actions.
The editors, therefore, discard the contention that law has nothing
meaningful to say about the nuclear peril. They point out that the lack
of precedent for legal involvement in this field is not a controlling argu-
ment: "the history of law is . .. one of growth."' 2 They cite the
Nuremburg trials and the comment of Robert Jackson, the chief Ameri-
can prosecutor, that if no law existed to punish the Nazi leaders, then it
was time to make some law.
However cogent and persuasive the legal arguments are that the pos-
session of these weapons may well be illegal and that their use would
certainly be so, it seems highly unlikely that those who now control the
foreign and defense policies of the nuclear powers can be persuaded to
eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Our nuclear dilemma is, I fear, even
more serious than the authors perceive. The immense gulf between
much current strategic thinking and these lawyers' briefs on the incom-
t Partner, Clifford & Warnke; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
1977-78.
1. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 945 (1967)(suit challenging U.S. involvement in Vietnam dismissed because it improperly
sought judicial review of political questions); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir.
1973)(implementation of President's directive ordering military actions against North Vietnam
presents a nonjusticiable political question).
2. P. ix (Introduction).
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patibility of nuclear weaponry with international and American constitu-
tional law is highlighted by the final paragraph of the editors'
introduction:
No one likes nuclear weapons, thinks they better the human existence, or
should be used. Can't we get rid of them?; and can't law be of some help?
3
I wish this, were so. The sad fact, however, is that nuclear weapons have
their fan club. Many strategic thinkers believe that nuclear weapons
serve a useful purpose in preserving world peace and that there are cir-
cumstances in which they should and would be used. Many others, on
what I consider to be much sounder grounds, believe that we cannot get
rid of them completely, and that prevention of nuclear war, for the fore-
seeable future, will depend upon preserving the nuclear stalemate at the
lowest possible level of numbers and risk.
The editors categorically reject the deterrence doctrine: "A deterrence
justification for American and Soviet nuclear stockpiles is nothing more
than circular logic so clearly insane that even its proponents shudder to
think of a world perpetually trapped in it."
'4
I understand their revulsion, but I think they are wrong. Mutual deter-
rence created by a stable strategic balance is not a crazy theory; it is an
inescapable fact of life under the present system of sovereign states. We
cannot scrap it and wait for a world government to provide a better solu-
tion. Instead, law and lawyers should direct their efforts to the improve-
ment of deterrence and strategic stability.
I believe, however, that before law can be of much help in reducing the
nuclear peril, a general consensus will have to be reached on the proposi-
tion that nuclear weapons are not really military weapons at all and that
their sole purpose is to prevent the use or the plausible threat of the use
of nuclear weapons by anyone else. There is no such consensus today.
5
As recently as three years ago, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
said, in his annual report to the United States Congress, that one of the
minimum purposes of our nuclear forces is to "impose termination of a
major war-on terms favorable to the United States and our allies-even
3. P. xiii (Introduction).
4. Id.
5. The development of consensus is impeded by the frequent turnover of U.S. officials in
national security positions. A more retentive institutional memory is badly needed. Lawyers'
skills in analysis and in applying relevant precedents can be useful in seeing that the learning
process does not have to begin anew whenever an administration changes. For an interesting
discussion of how this role is played by the legal advisors to arms control delegations, see
McNeill, US.-USSR NuclearArms Negotiations. The Process and the Lawyer, 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 52 (1985).
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if nuclear weapons have been used."'6
The United States has also consistently refused to proclaim a policy of
no-first-use of nuclear weapons. For example, President Jimmy Carter
stated:
[T]o reduce the reliance of nations on nuclear weaponry, I hereby solemnly
declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use nuclear weapons
except in self-defense; that is, in circumstances of an actual nuclear or con-
ventional attack on the United States, our territories, or Armed Forces, or
such an attack on our allies.
7
The NATO doctrine of "flexible response" contemplates prompt escala-
tion first to tactical, then to strategic nuclear war in the event of a major
attack by the Warsaw Pact using only conventional weapons.
Moreover, much of the nuclear weaponry in the arsenals of the super-
powers is designed for nuclear war fighting, not merely for deterrence.
Nuclear depth charges, artillery shells, anti-aircraft missiles, and land
mines account for thousands of nuclear warheads. The growing capabil-
ity of strategic-range missiles to target and destroy ICBM silos breeds
scenarios of both limited and protracted nuclear conflict. Indeed, the
debate between those who attribute actual military potential to nuclear
weaponry and those who would eschew any use can be seen in the essays
contained in Part I of this volume, "Nuclear Weapons and International
Law."
In one essay, Harry H. Almond, Jr., Professor of International Law at
the National War College, argues that "The legality of nuclear weapons
has now been fully established through the treaties and international
agreements that cover them for arms control and other purposes." 8 As
he sees it:
[B]oth sides are maintaining the weapons that would ultimately be used for
war fighting (regardless, here, of the rationality of such a decision). Fur-
thermore, they have both developed the lesser nuclear weapons, weapons
with far less destructive force and with accurate targeting capabilities
(avoiding the stigma of indiscriminate weapons), and such weapons clearly
would have military utility.9
In contrast, Richard Falk, Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, points to the
dangers of accepting the arguments of those who would "shape nuclear
6. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1983, p.
1-18.
7. Address by President Jimmy Carter before the General Assembly of the United Na-






weapons policies around traditional moral/legal notions of 'defense' and
'military targets', thereby hoping. . . to reconcile normative considera-
tions with a reliance on nuclear weapons."'10 He concludes, "In effect,
taking international law and morality seriously in this manner definitely
erodes the crucial firebreak in war-planning that separates conventional
and nuclear weaponry, thereby making the outbreak of nuclear war far
more likely."'"
These two schools of thought have come to be known pejoratively as
"NUTS," for Nuclear Utilization Theorists, and "MAD," for adherents
of the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. During President Rea-
gan's first term, the official reports of the Secretary of Defense showed
the "NUTS" to be ahead. But then President Reagan, in his State of the
Union address in January 1984, came down, rhetorically at least, on the
"MAD" side. After repeating the admonition he had given to the United
Nations the preceding Fall-that a nuclear war cannot be won and must
not be fought-President Reagan stated, "the only value in our two na-
tions possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure that they will never be
used."' 12 This is classic and undiluted deterrence thinking. It leaves no
room for the argument that nuclear weapons can provide "extended de-
terrence" to prevent conventional war by threatening a nuclear riposte to
any who might initiate the use of military force.
Judging from his speech reprinted in this collection, Professor John
Norton Moore, of the University of Virginia School of Law, would not
accept the President's doctrine that nuclear weapons are for nuclear de-
terrence alone. He argues that "to declare a tactical use of nuclear weap-
ons illegal against an overwhelming conventional attack by, for example,
the Soviets in Europe, would substantially decrease deterrence and in-
crease the risk of war."' 13 In sharp contrast, Elliott Meyrowitz, of the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University, considers
any threat to use nuclear weapons to be "legally and morally bank-
rupt."14 I find myself in the curious position of agreeing with President
Reagan-or at least with the doctrine enunciated in his State of the
Union address-over either of these two views.
The entire rationale of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) is inconsistent with the notion that nuclear weapons can be used to
fight and win nuclear wars, and that they serve a valuable purpose in
10. P. ill.
11. P. 112 (emphasis in original).
12. State of the Union Address of President Ronald Reagan, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
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preventing conventional wars. His argument, and that of his defense ad-
visors, is that creation of nuclear defenses can first discourage the further
accumulation of offensive nuclear weapons, and then lead to their sub-
stantial reduction and eventual elimination. 15 The Administration's new
strategic concept, described by strategic arms negotiation advisor Paul
H. Nitze as being at the heart of the American approach to the current
arms talks, provides:
During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the
power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabili-
zation of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms,
whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period
of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear
arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contri-
bution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period
of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both
offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objec-
tive to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.
16
Experience has made me more than a little cynical about calls for the
total elimination of nuclear weapons. Too often, those who call for "real
nuclear disarmament" are simply seeking to mask their opposition to
achievable measures of nuclear arms control. When it comes to reducing
the risk of nuclear war, the theoretical best may indeed be the enemy of
the realizable good. But I prefer to believe that the Reagan Administra-
tion rhetoric of the past several months reflects not just verbal legerde-
main, but a growing realization that there is no security to be gained in a
continuing effort by the two superpowers to gain strategic superiority.
Strikingly, President Reagan and his colleagues now espouse the same
aspirations as those of the nuclear peace groups. Both speak of their
vision of a world that is free of the oppressive horror of nuclear
weaponry.
But this theme that strikes so responsive a chord in American breasts
casts a chill in those of our European allies. They are not apt to agree
with the editors that "no one likes nuclear weapons." The notion of a
world without nuclear weapons, or, even worse, one in which the United
States is protected from nuclear attack by some magic curtain (Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative) is, to many Europeans, a world made safe
for conventional warfare.
17
15. In my view, however, President Reagan's SDI would almost inevitably mean more
offensive weapons and less stability.
16. Soviet-American Relations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 26, 1985) (statement of Paul H. Nitze).




For Europeans, prevention of nuclear war is not enough. Deterrence
of any war must be as complete as possible, even if this means a greater
risk of nuclear war if deterrence fails. Accordingly, the shortage of Euro-
pean lawyers among the contributors to Nuclear Weapons and Law is not
surprising. Professor B. V. A. Rbling of the Netherlands has contributed
a scholarly dissertation arguing for a total prohibition of war, and stating
that, while he does not believe that the first use of nuclear arms is as yet
prohibited by international law, such use should be banned.18 He con-
cludes, however, that "[t]he question whether all possession of nuclear
arms needs to' be banned can be left out of consideration for now." 19
And he notes that such a decision can be made by succeeding generations
"in view of the existing political climate and the military technology of
the time."'2
0
In contrast, the more typical reaction of our NATO allies to no-first-
use proposals is to complain that the issue is too controversial and too
dangerous even to be discussed. This unwillingness to entertain a declar-
atory policy of no-first-use, however, does not necessarily forecast what
European reaction would be if faced with an actual decision to convert a
conventional conflict into a nuclear war. NATO's declared policy
of flexible response, including escalation to use of nuclear weapons in the
event of a conventional attack, is intended largely for Soviet
consumption.
My major quarrel with the content of this volume is its preoccupation,
to the point of tiring reiteration, with the debate about whether any and
all use of nuclear weapons should be deemed illegal. Some of the authors
might usefully have noted their legitimate moral and legal doubts as a
context in which to consider some promising proposals that would signif-
icantly lessen the risk of nuclear war. For example, some attention could
well have been given to the report of the Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues, better known as the Palme Commis-
sion Report.21 The Commission is composed of present and former gov-
clear to me during a 1967 meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. The defense minis-
ters had been debating the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, with the North American mem-
bers speaking of the immense devastation that these so-called battlefield weapons could cause
to the continent of Europe. The British defense minister turned to his West German colleague
and said that the two of them, one having seen Coventry and the other having seen Cologne
after the fire storms caused by conventional bomb attacks, might be excused for feeling some-
what less impressed by the problems of using tactical nuclear arms than Americans whose




21. THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES, COM-
MON SECURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL (1982).
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ernent officials from many countries, including Cyrus Vance, former
Secretary of State, and Giorgi Arbatov, head of the Soviet Institute on
the United States and Canada. Among its recommendations is the estab-
lishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central Europe.
Within a zone of 150 kilometers on each side of the east-west dividing
line, neither nuclear munitions nor storage sites for such arms would be
permitted.
This plan would not, of course, guarantee that tactical nuclear weap-
ons could not be used. They could be redeployed into the central Euro-
pean zone with relative ease. But the decision to return the nuclear
munitions to a forward position would be a difficult one to take, posing as
it would grave dangers of aggravating a crisis situation. The existence of
the nuclear-free-zone would lessen the chance that border incidents, mis-
take, or miscalculation might lead to early use of nuclear weaponry
before it could be overrun and captured. Experience indicates, moreover,
that weaponry removed and stored away from the potential battlefront
would come to be seen as of little value and perhaps not worth the cost of
maintenance.
It does not require complete acceptance of the arguments that nuclear
weapons and nuclear doctrine offend principles of international and con-
stitutional law to reach the conclusion that their early use would be crim-
inal folly. Included in this collection of legal analyses is the letter from
William H. Taft, IV, then the general counsel of the Department of De-
fense and now the Deputy Secretary. Mr. Taft recognizes "the existence
of the constitutional duty to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the threat
that nuclear weapons pose to the individual freedom and rights of Ameri-
cans set out in the Constitution.
'22
Widespread recognition of this duty, as exhibited in Part II of the
book, "Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law," should lend strong
support to the cogent constitutional argument developed by Jeremy J.
Stone, Director of the Federation of American Scientists, that the Presi-
dent of the United States does not have the sole authority to initiate the
use of nuclear weapons in conventional wars. 23 Some contributors to the
volume believe that the Constitution imposes more stringent restrictions
on the President than those outlined by Stone. For example, Professor
Arval A. Morris, of the University of Washington, believes that the Pres-
ident has legitimate unilateral power only "to repel a nuclear attack on
the United States that is in process .... ,,24
22. P. 338.





For too many years, the American public has been unduly passive
about nuclear weapons and plans for their use. Nuclear arms-have been
treated as if they raised no new questions, but simply provided "more
bang for the buck." The assumption that they are nothing more than
newer and better munitions has led to the futile chase for strategic superi-
ority and unthinking acceptance of the principle that more of them
means more security.
The dichotomy in strategic thinking and the present lack of a consen-
sus as to the inutility of nuclear weapons for military purposes make it
virtually unthinkable that the nuclear powers will soon adopt the propo-
sition that nuclear weapons are presumptively illegal and their use con-
clusively so. As I have suggested, however, this does not make essays
like those written for this book a wholly academic exercise. They can
encourage useful reformation in the way that countries view nuclear
weapons and develop strategic plans for their possible use. The compel-
ling arguments presented here can reinforce promising intitiatives that
would significantly lessen the risk of nuclear war.
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